In 86% of enterprise breaches involving lateral movement, the attacker used a valid credential rather than a novel exploit, according to Verizon's 2026 Data Breach Investigations Report. Pass-the-hash is the technique behind most of those cases: the attacker steals an NTLM hash from memory, then authenticates to other systems on the network using that hash directly. No plaintext password needed. No brute force. No exploit.
A pass-the-hash attack (MITRE ATT&CK T1550.002) is a lateral-movement technique in which an attacker extracts a Windows NTLM password hash from memory or a local database, then presents that hash to a remote system as proof of identity. Because the NTLM protocol was designed to accept a hash as the authenticating secret, the target system grants access without the attacker ever knowing or cracking the underlying password.
The attack divides into two phases: hash acquisition and lateral movement. Each phase uses standard Windows tooling that security software does not block by default.
Windows stores NTLM hashes for logged-on users in the lsass.exe process (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service). When a user authenticates, the hash is cached in memory to support single sign-on across the session. A local administrator on that machine can read lsass memory directly.
Mimikatz, the most common acquisition tool, uses a single command:
privilege::debug
sekurlsa::logonpasswords
privilege::debug requests the SeDebugPrivilege right, which Windows grants to local administrators by default. sekurlsa::logonpasswords then reads the WDigest and MSV1_0 authentication packages from lsass memory and prints every NTLM hash for every currently logged-on user, including service accounts and any administrator who has remotely logged in.
Three other common acquisition paths exist:
reg save HKLM\SAM sam.hiv followed by offline parsing yields local account hashes. Requires SYSTEM privileges.ntdsutil or vssadmin create shadow to extract it. This is the full domain credential store.lsadump::dcsync /user:administrator.Once the attacker has an NTLM hash, they supply it in place of a password to any tool that supports NTLM authentication. The impacket Python toolkit's psexec.py accepts a hash directly:
psexec.py domain/username@targethost -hashes :aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:NTLM_HASH_HERE
The left side of the colon is the LM hash (always a constant in modern Windows). The right side is the NTLM hash. The target system receives a valid NTLM challenge-response and grants shell access. The attacker is now running commands on a second host using the first victim's credentials. That is lateral movement without any exploit, any password crack, or any new malware deployment.
Pass-the-hash is frequently confused with two adjacent Active Directory techniques. The differences matter for defense prioritisation.
| Technique | MITRE ID | What it uses | Protocol | Primary defense |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pass-the-Hash | T1550.002 | Captured NTLM hash | NTLM | Credential Guard + disable NTLM |
| Pass-the-Ticket | T1550.003 | Captured Kerberos TGT or service ticket | Kerberos | Protected Users group + short ticket lifetime |
| NTLM Relay | T1557.001 | Live NTLM challenge-response (intercepted) | NTLM | SMB signing + disable LLMNR/NBT-NS |
| Kerberoasting | T1558.003 | Kerberos service tickets (offline cracking) | Kerberos | AES-only SPNs + strong service account passwords |
Pass-the-hash requires NTLM. If your environment has fully migrated to Kerberos and disabled NTLM, PtH is not viable. NTLM relay is a live interception attack; it does not require the hash to be on disk at all. Kerberoasting targets service accounts specifically and results in offline cracking, not direct reuse. Each technique needs its own countermeasures.
Credential Guard is the single most effective PtH mitigation available in modern Windows. It moves NTLM hashes and Kerberos tickets from lsass.exe into an isolated Virtual Secure Mode (VSM) container that runs in a separate hypervisor-protected memory region. Mimikatz cannot read VSM memory from the host OS, even with SeDebugPrivilege and SYSTEM rights.
Credential Guard requires:
Enable it via Group Policy at: Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > System > Device Guard > Turn On Virtualization Based Security. Set Credential Guard Configuration to "Enabled with UEFI lock" for maximum protection. The UEFI lock prevents an attacker with local admin rights from simply disabling it via registry.
Starting with Windows 11 22H2 and Windows Server 2025, Credential Guard is enabled by default on all eligible hardware. Organisations still running Windows 10 non-Enterprise SKUs or Server 2012/2016 do not receive this protection automatically.
The Protected Users group, introduced in Windows Server 2012 R2, applies a set of hardened authentication policies to any account added to it. For domain administrators and other privileged accounts, the most relevant restriction is this: members cannot authenticate using NTLM under any circumstances. Even if a hash is captured, the account cannot be used in a PtH attack because the domain will reject the NTLM attempt outright.
Additional restrictions for Protected Users members:
Add accounts via Active Directory Users and Computers or PowerShell:
Add-ADGroupMember -Identity "Protected Users" -Members "svc-backup","svc-deploy","admin-jcarter"
Test thoroughly before adding service accounts. Some legacy applications use NTLM explicitly and will break. The right response is to fix those applications, not exclude the accounts.
Even without Credential Guard, LSA Protection (Protected Process Light) prevents non-protected processes from reading lsass memory. When enabled, lsass.exe runs as a Protected Process, and tools like Mimikatz cannot open a handle to it without a signed, Microsoft-approved driver.
Enable via registry:
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa
Value: RunAsPPL = 1 (DWORD)
Or deploy via Group Policy Preference or Intune. A system restart is required. On Windows 11 22H2 and later, LSA Protection is enabled by default and shows a warning in Windows Security if disabled. On earlier versions, it must be set manually.
LSA Protection does not stop DCSync or SAM database attacks. It specifically blocks in-memory lsass reads. It is a defence-in-depth layer, not a standalone control.
No NTLM means no PtH. Where Kerberos is available across all systems, disabling NTLM entirely closes the attack class. The practical path is a phased restriction rather than an immediate toggle.
Start with auditing. Enable NTLM logging via Group Policy at: Computer Configuration > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > Security Options > Network Security: Restrict NTLM: Audit NTLM authentication in this domain. Set to "Enable all." Review Event ID 8004 in the Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing log to find every system still using NTLM.
Once dependencies are mapped, escalate restrictions:
Full NTLM removal in large enterprise environments typically takes three to six months when legacy application dependencies are present. The CISA guide "Eliminating Obsolete Transport Layer Security" uses the same phased model for comparable protocol removal projects.
Credential Guard and Protected Users are preventive. SIEM rules catch PtH on systems where those controls are missing or bypassed.
| Event ID | Log Source | Indicator | What it signals |
|---|---|---|---|
| 4624 (Logon Type 3 or 9) | Windows Security | AuthenticationPackageName = NTLM, SubjectUserName != TargetUserName, WorkstationName shows an internal host | Network or NewCredentials NTLM logon from a different account; possible PtH lateral movement |
| Sysmon Event 10 | Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon | TargetImage = lsass.exe, GrantedAccess contains 0x1010 or 0x1410 | Process attempting to read lsass memory with credential-read permissions; direct lsass dump attempt |
| 4768 / 4769 from unexpected source | Windows Security (DC) | Kerberos TGT or service ticket request from an IP not associated with the account's normal location | Post-PtH account use from a new host; confirms successful lateral movement in progress |
Correlate Event ID 4624 lateral logons with Sysmon 10 events on the source host from the previous 30 minutes. If a lsass read preceded the network logon, the alert confidence rises from suspicious to high-confidence PtH. Add a 5-minute suppression window on the correlation rule to avoid alert fatigue from legitimate admin tools like SCCM agents.
Pass-the-hash against local administrator accounts is a separate problem from domain account PtH. If every workstation in the fleet shares the same local admin password, a single compromised hash enables movement to every machine. Microsoft's Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS), now built into Windows 11 and Server 2022 as Windows LAPS, randomises the local admin password per machine and stores it in Active Directory with ACL-controlled read access.
Deploy Windows LAPS via Group Policy at: Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > System > LAPS. Set a 30-day rotation period and require AES-256 encrypted storage in the directory. This eliminates the shared-local-admin hash problem that made PtH explosively lateral in pre-2019 environments.
The combination of Windows LAPS for local accounts, Credential Guard for domain account hashes, Protected Users for privileged domain accounts, and NTLM restriction where Kerberos is available covers the full PtH attack surface across a standard Windows enterprise estate.
Service accounts are a frequent PtH target because their credentials rarely rotate and they often carry elevated permissions. A password manager purpose-built for teams provides automatic secret rotation, vault-level access controls, and audit logs that show exactly which users accessed which credential. For security teams managing shared service account passwords, NordPass Business includes admin-enforced rotation policies and a zero-knowledge architecture, meaning even a breach of the vault provider does not expose the underlying secrets.
Pairing a credential vault with Credential Guard closes two separate gaps: the vault prevents exposed service account passwords from being used as PtH acquisition targets, and Credential Guard prevents interactive session hashes from being read out of lsass memory.
A pass-the-hash attack (MITRE ATT&CK T1550.002) is a lateral-movement technique in which an attacker captures an NTLM password hash from Windows memory or a local database, then presents that hash to a remote system as proof of identity. The target system grants access without the attacker knowing or cracking the plaintext password, because NTLM authentication accepts a valid hash as the authenticating secret.
Credential Guard prevents lsass memory reads on systems where it is enabled, stopping Mimikatz-style hash extraction from interactive sessions. It does not protect local account hashes in the SAM database, nor does it prevent DCSync attacks against domain controllers where the attacking account has Replicating Directory Changes permissions. It is the most effective single preventive control, but it covers one acquisition path rather than all of them.
Event ID 4624 with Logon Type 3 and AuthenticationPackageName = NTLM, combined with Sysmon Event ID 10 showing lsass.exe being accessed with 0x1010 or 0x1410 granted access on the source host, is the most reliable detection correlation. Neither event alone is sufficient; the correlation between a credential dump and a subsequent NTLM network logon from the same source host is the high-confidence indicator.
Pass-the-hash uses a captured NTLM hash and targets NTLM authentication. Pass-the-ticket uses a captured Kerberos TGT or service ticket and targets Kerberos authentication. Disabling NTLM eliminates PtH but does not affect pass-the-ticket. Both are lateral-movement techniques; they target different authentication protocols and require different mitigations.
Windows LAPS randomises the local administrator password per machine, so a hash captured from one workstation is valid only for that workstation. It directly eliminates the shared-local-admin hash problem that historically allowed PtH to propagate across an entire fleet from a single compromised endpoint. LAPS is built into Windows 11 and Windows Server 2022 and is deployable via Group Policy.
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