An attacker with a compromised Domain Admin account can run one Mimikatz command and walk away with every password hash in the entire Active Directory forest, including the krbtgt key that enables Kerberos ticket forgery for the next decade. That technique is a DCSync attack. It is not a vulnerability or a software bug. It is Active Directory working exactly as designed, exploited by anyone who holds the right replication permission.
A DCSync attack (MITRE ATT&CK T1003.006) is a credential-dumping technique in which an attacker impersonates a domain controller by calling Active Directory's MS-DRSR replication protocol to request password hashes for any account in the domain. No physical access to a domain controller is required. No disk touch. No exploit. Just a privileged account and a single Mimikatz command.
Active Directory replication is how domain controllers stay in sync. When a DC receives a password change, it uses the MS-DRSR protocol to replicate that change to other DCs via the GetNCChanges() RPC call. The design assumption is that only trusted DCs call this function. DCSync breaks that assumption by calling GetNCChanges() from an ordinary workstation or server, using an account that has been granted (or has stolen) replication permissions.
DCSync requires an account with two specific permissions on the domain root object:
Domain Controllers hold both rights by default. So do members of Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, and the Administrators group on the domain. An attacker who compromises any of those via pass-the-hash, Kerberoasting, NTLM relay, or phishing has DCSync capability the moment they authenticate.
In some environments, legacy delegations granted these permissions to Exchange server accounts or backup software service accounts years ago and were never revoked. Those accounts represent DCSync exposure that most AD teams do not know exists.
Mimikatz implements DCSync with a single command. To pull the krbtgt hash:
lsadump::dcsync /user:krbtgt
To dump every account in the domain at once:
lsadump::dcsync /domain:company.internal /all /csv
The output is a CSV of every account's NTLM hash, AES Kerberos keys, and password history. The attacker now has offline cracking material for every account and can pass any hash directly for lateral movement.
DCSync is frequently grouped with NTLM-based attacks, but it operates at the Kerberos and directory layer. The distinctions matter for building targeted defenses.
| Technique | MITRE ID | What it targets | Protocol | Primary defense |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DCSync | T1003.006 | All domain account hashes via AD replication | MS-DRSR (RPC) | Audit and restrict Replicating Directory Changes All |
| Pass-the-Hash | T1550.002 | Single account NTLM hash for lateral movement | NTLM | Credential Guard + disable NTLM |
| NTLM Relay | T1557.001 | Live NTLM challenge-response (intercepted) | NTLM | SMB signing + disable LLMNR/NBT-NS |
| Kerberoasting | T1558.003 | Service account hashes (offline cracking) | Kerberos | AES-only SPNs + 25-character service account passwords |
| Golden Ticket | T1558.001 | Forged TGT using the krbtgt hash | Kerberos | Rotate krbtgt twice + MDI Golden Ticket alert |
DCSync is typically the step that enables Golden Ticket attacks. An attacker uses another technique (pass-the-hash, phishing, Kerberoasting) to reach a Domain Admin account, then uses DCSync to grab krbtgt and establish long-term persistence through ticket forgery. Closing DCSync closes the bridge between initial privilege escalation and persistent domain ownership.
Two independent detection mechanisms exist. Using both reduces the gap between attack and alert.
Event ID 4662 fires when a directory object operation is performed. For DCSync, the event appears on the targeted domain controller with these specific field values:
The detection logic filters on that last condition. Domain controller computer accounts end in $, so any 4662 event with these GUIDs from an account name that does not end in $ is a DCSync indicator. The corresponding SIEM query in KQL (Microsoft Sentinel):
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4662
| where ObjectType == "domainDNS"
| where Properties has "1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2"
| where SubjectAccount !endswith "$"
| project TimeGenerated, SubjectAccount, Computer, ObjectName
This query requires that Advanced Audit Policy for "Directory Service Access" is enabled under Computer Configuration > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Advanced Audit Policy > DS Access. Confirm it is active on all domain controllers before relying on this detection.
Microsoft Defender for Identity (MDI) provides network-based detection that does not depend on audit policy configuration. MDI sensors deployed on domain controllers inspect raw MS-DRSR RPC traffic and generate a "Suspected DCSync attack (replication of directory services)" alert when a non-DC account calls GetNCChanges(). The alert severity is high and maps directly to T1003.006 in the MITRE framework.
MDI is the more reliable of the two detections because it cannot be bypassed by clearing Windows event logs. The Event ID 4662 route is bypassed by any attacker who can clear the Security event log before analysis, which requires the same Domain Admin privilege that enables DCSync in the first place. Using both gives depth.
The fundamental fix is to remove Replicating Directory Changes All from every account that is not a domain controller. Run the following PowerShell on a domain controller to identify every account holding the permission:
Import-Module ActiveDirectory
$domain = (Get-ADDomain).DistinguishedName
$acl = Get-Acl "AD:\$domain"
$replicateAllGuid = [GUID]"1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2"
$acl.Access | Where-Object {
$_.ObjectType -eq $replicateAllGuid
} | Select-Object IdentityReference, ActiveDirectoryRights, AccessControlType
Review every identity returned. Domain Controllers (names ending in $), Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, and the built-in Administrators group are expected. Any service account, backup agent, or legacy Exchange account appearing in that list is an unnecessary exposure. Remove the permission via Active Directory Users and Computers: open the domain root properties, go to Security (Advanced), find the unexpected entry, and remove DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All.
DCSync is only possible from an account that has Tier 0 access to Active Directory. Microsoft's tiered administration model separates administrative accounts into three tiers: Tier 0 covers domain controllers and AD itself, Tier 1 covers server infrastructure, and Tier 2 covers workstations. Tier 0 administrative sessions should only be initiated from Privileged Access Workstations (PAWs), which are hardened, network-isolated machines with no internet access and no email clients.
Placing Tier 0 accounts in the Protected Users Security Group adds further constraints: Protected Users members cannot authenticate using NTLM, cannot use DES or RC4 Kerberos encryption, and cannot use Kerberos unconstrained delegation. An attacker who steals a Protected Users account hash cannot use pass-the-hash against it, reducing the acquisition path for the privileged credential that enables DCSync.
If DCSync has occurred (or is suspected), the krbtgt password must be reset. A single reset is insufficient because Active Directory retains the previous krbtgt password to maintain in-flight tickets. All existing Golden Tickets use either the current or previous hash. Resetting twice, with at least 24 hours between resets, overwrites both copies and invalidates all forged tickets.
Microsoft's script for this process is available in the Microsoft Download Center as "New-KrbtgtKeys.ps1". It handles the sequencing and verifies the rotation completed on all domain controllers before exiting.
Service accounts targeted by DCSync often carry elevated permissions because they were provisioned with broad rights for legacy software integrations that no longer run. A credential vault with rotation enforcement prevents those accounts from becoming permanent high-value targets. For teams managing shared privileged credentials across multiple systems, NordPass Business provides admin-enforced rotation policies, vault-level access controls, and zero-knowledge architecture so that a compromised vault provider cannot expose the underlying secrets.
Pairing a credential vault with the MDI detection pipeline creates two independent controls: the vault reduces the attack surface by ensuring service account passwords rotate before they can be exploited, and MDI ensures that any DCSync attempt against even a recently rotated account generates an immediate high-severity alert.
A DCSync attack (MITRE ATT&CK T1003.006) abuses Active Directory's MS-DRSR replication protocol to request password hashes from a domain controller as if the attacker's account were a replicating DC. Any account with Replicating Directory Changes All permission can call GetNCChanges() and receive NTLM hashes, AES Kerberos keys, and password history for any account in the domain. No physical access to a domain controller is required, and the attack leaves minimal evidence if Windows audit policy is not configured to log directory object access.
By default, only domain controller computer accounts, members of Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, and the built-in Administrators group hold Replicating Directory Changes All. In environments with legacy Exchange server installations, some Exchange service accounts may also hold this right. Run the PowerShell audit in the Prevention section above to generate a full list of accounts with the permission in your domain.
DCSync can retrieve the krbtgt account's NTLM hash. With that hash, an attacker can forge Kerberos TGTs valid for any user, including Domain Admins, with an expiry of up to 10 years. These Golden Tickets (T1558.001) bypass Active Directory authentication checks. Invalidating them requires resetting the krbtgt password twice, at least 24 hours apart, to overwrite both the current and previous hash values stored by AD.
Windows Security Event ID 4662 is the primary log-based signal. Filter for EventID 4662 on domain controllers where ObjectType is domainDNS, Properties include GUID 1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 (DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All), and SubjectAccount does not end in $. Advanced Audit Policy for Directory Service Access must be enabled on all DCs for this event to generate. Microsoft Defender for Identity provides network-based detection that does not depend on audit policy.
Yes. MDI generates a "Suspected DCSync attack (replication of directory services)" high-severity alert by inspecting raw MS-DRSR RPC traffic from its sensors on domain controllers. It does not depend on Windows event logs and fires whether or not the attacker clears the Security log. The alert is integrated with Microsoft Sentinel and maps to MITRE ATT&CK T1003.006.
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